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 The paper analyses the changes at the level of social capital (SC) in Croatia 
during the period of 1995 to 2003. Starting from theoretical and empirical argu-
ments which link SC with economic growth, social development and political sta-
bility, the author uses data from two research projects carried out on representa-
tive national samples (World Values Survey – Croatia 1995 and South East Euro-
pean Social Survey, 2003), in order to establish and discuss changes at the SC 
level. The conducted analyses show a decrease in social capital, which cannot be 
solely attributed to the situational effect present during the 1995 survey. The 
paper analyses the suitability of the standard macro approach to measuring SC in 
the transitional context, but also points out the influence of perception of the 
extent of corruption on the negative dynamics of SC. 
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 According to the analyses presented in a recent paper (Štulhofer, 2003a), social capi-
tal (SC) in Croatia decreased during the period of 1995 to 1999.1 To be more precise, 
during the observed period all the three usual indicators of SC decreased: generalized 
trust, civic participation and trust in institutions. Nevertheless, in the conclusion of the 
paper it is suggested that the change should not be particularly disturbing. Given the 
specific situation during both measurement periods (the 1995 research was carried out 
immediately after the operation “Storm”, whereas the 1999 research was conducted 
prior to important parliamentary elections), the author argued that the collected data 
 
1 The author wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for useful criticisms, comments and suggestions. 
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were strongly marked by the situational effects which in 1995 probably led to a short-
term increase, and in 1999 to a decrease in the values of SC indicators.2 Following this 
assumption, the significance of the finding on negative dynamics of SC was down-
played (Štulhofer, 2003a). 
 The third measurement of SC was conducted in late 2003 within the international re-
search project South East European Social Survey. The new measurement provides a 
clearer assessment of dynamics of SC in Croatia, but in the same time raises a series of 
questions as to the suitability of the macro approach to SC in the context of post-com-
munist transition. 
 
Introduction: The Theory of Social Capital and Its Shortcomings 
 Social capital denotes a cluster of specific characteristics of social life, norms and 
customs, which support cooperation and solidarity (Fukuyama, 2000). SC is often de-
fined as a characteristic of social structure, as civic participation or density of relation-
ships among the members of community, which is characterized by widespread mutual 
trust, collective actions and respect for (shared) norms (Portes, 1998; Brehm/Rahn, 
1997; Grix, 2001). 
 One of the basic reasons for the popularity of SC in social sciences is its positive so-
cietal impact or development potential which has been recently reflected in concerns for 
the decline of SC (Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 1993; 2000). SC has become a synonym for 
positive influence of informal norms and institutions on growth and development. In 
other words, SC has been interpreted as a resource which makes communities economi-
cally more prosperous (Torsvik, 2000), socially more stable (Sandefur/Laumann, 1998), 
more creative (Hospers/van Lochem, 2002), healthier (see Petersen, 2002), safer 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2001), as well as happier and more content (Bjornskov, 2003). In re-
cent years, the importance of SC has been empirically confirmed in the transitional 
context as well (Mihaylova, 2004; Dowley/Silver, 2002), both in terms of linking the 
trust in institutions and civic participation with economic growth (Raiser et al., 2001), 
and pointing out the deficit of civility (Rose et al., 1997) and civic participation (Pal-
dam/Svendsen, 2001) in the post-communist societies. 
 The macro-analytical application of the SC model has been initiated by the re-
nowned Putnam’s research on Italian regions (Putnam, 1993). By explaining the persis-
tence of differences between the prosperous North and improsperous South, Putnam 
highlights the importance of historical development of civic community and pertaining 
norms of reciprocity, social trust and civic association. According to the theoretical 
model, the norms of reciprocity, trust and association are closely related dimensions, 
which mutually establish and support each other. Putnam uses the same dimensions of 
SC in his recent analyses of the dynamics of SC in the USA (Putnam, 2000).  
 
2 The data collected in 1999 are not used in this paper, since the author does not have permission for 
secondary analysis. 
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 Putnam’s model has been subject to a series of criticisms (Grix, 2001), both concep-
tual and methodological. As to the former, the critics emphasized the lack of elaboration 
of the model (is SC a dependant or independent variable in relation to trust?), its exces-
sive scope, ahistoricism and decontextualisation (Fine, 1999; 2003), conceptual vague-
ness (problems with distinguishing the positive from the negative SC; Streeten, 2002), 
as well as ignoring the dynamics of social power and the role of the state (Foley and 
Edwards, 1999; Grix, 2001; Hospers/Van Lochem, 2002; Mihaylova, 2004; Maloney et 
al., 2000). On the other hand, methodological problems related to the measurement of 
fundamental dimensions were pointed out (see Grix, 2001). More precisely, empirical 
validity of generalized trust was questioned (what does it really represent?), as well as 
the problematic aggregation of civic organizations (does a church choir help in devel-
oping democratic habits to the same extent as an environmental association does?) and 
similarly problematic generalizations used for measuring trust in institutions (how are 
we to determine the level of trust in the press if a respondent completely trusts one 
newspapers while seriously doubting the objectivity of others?). 
 Without underestimating the importance of suggested criticisms, this paper nonethe-
less follows the logic of macro measurement of SC or the so called Putnam’s approach. 
The main reason for such stubbornness is the fact that the macro approach is still the 
sole method for monitoring the dynamics of SC on the national level. The emphasis on 
time dimension is of particular importance for political analyses and social planning. 
Ignorance of socio-cultural trends, of which the dynamics of SC is one the central ele-
ments, substantially impoverishes the social decision making process. Without dynamic 
insight, policy activities lack strategic dimension and realistic development orientation. 
 
Methods 
 The paper uses the data from the two research projects the author was involved in, 
World Value Survey – Croatia 1995 (Erasmus Guild, Zagreb) and South East European 
Social Survey 2003 (Institute for Sociology, University of Tromso, Norway). Both re-
search projects were carried out on probabilistic, nationally representative sample. The 
first study included 1196, and the second one 1250 citizens of Croatia aged 20 and 
above. With the purpose of increasing the external validity of conclusions, the analyses 
that follow have been carried out on weighted data. The realized samples were weighted 
for age, gender and education according to the population parameters from the 1991 and 
2001 census, respectively. 
 SC has been measured through three standard dimensions (Raiser et al., 2001; de 
Mello, 2004; Brehm/Rahn, 1997; Foley/Edwards, 1999; Štulhofer, 2003a): generalized 
trust, trust in institutions and civic participation. The indicator of generalized trust was a 
dichotomous variable measureing the level of trust in other, unknown, members of 
community. Respondents had to chose one of the two responses: “most people can be 
trusted” (value 1) or “one needs to be very careful in dealing with other people” (value 
0). The indicator of trust in institutions was obtained by aggregating the levels of trust 
(from “a great deal or quite a lot” to “none at all”) in twelve social institutions. Theo-
retical range was 1–4, and the values were recoded so that a greater value denotes 
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greater trust in formal institutions.3 Reliability of this index was very good (α = 0,87). 
The last indicator, an index of civic participation, was a composite variable obtained by 
aggregating data on membership in eight types of nongovernmental organizations.4 The 
theoretical range of the index was 0–8.5 
 Religiosity was measured through the frequency of participation in religious ser-
vices. Due to slightly different formulation of the scale in the two questionnaires, the 
variable has been dichotomised, with 0 denoting the frequency of religious participation 
that occurs less than once a week, and 1 denoting religious participation occuring once a 
week or more often.  
 Political orientation has been assessed by the usual left-right scale. Respondents 
were asked to locate their political views on the scale of ten degrees, with categories 
“left” (1) and “right” (10) at its ends.  
 Perception of corruption was measured with a question about its extent among pub-
lic officials (“To what extent are bribes and corruption spread in this country, among 
persons who work in civil services?”). Answers were recorded on a 4-item scale: (1) 
almost none of them are involved in it, (2) only few of them are involved, (3) most of 
them are involved, (4) almost all of them are involved. 
 
Results 
Socal Capital as a Latent Dimension 
 Measurement of SC is usually operationalized through a certain number of indica-
tors (Raiser and associates, 2001; de Mello, 2004; Brehm/Rahn, 1997; Foley/Edwards, 
1999; Štulhofer, 2003a). In order to assess reliability of such approach, correlation be-
tween the indicators used has been examined (Raiser and associates, 2001; 
Brehm/Rahn, 1997), but not in the Croatian context. Given the theoretical postulate on 
mutual entanglement of trust and civic participation (Putnam, 2003; Štulhofer, 2003b), 
an explanatory factor analysis was carried out to establish whether the three indicators 
indeed form the latent dimension of SC, as suggested by Bjornskov (2003).6 The results 
presented in Table 1 confirm the expectation. In both points of time one all three indi-
cators are loaded on a single factor, which suggests that the construct is reliable and 
robust. 
 
3 The trust in the following institutions was included: the church, the army, the legal system, the press, 
television, trade unions, the police, political parties, government, parliament, the European Union and the 
United Nations. 
4 These were religious, sports or recreational, art and educational associations, trade unions, political 
parties, environmental organizations, professional societies and other civic associations.  
5 Due to its rather skewed distribution, the civic participation index, when used as a dependent variable in 
a multiple regression, was dichotomised. Respondents were divided into two groups: those who were not 
members of any association and those who were members of at least one association. 
6 The principal components method was used for factor extraction.  
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Table 1: Factor analysis of the SC indicators 
Factor loadings  
1995 2003 
Generalized trust 0,78 0,72 
Civic participation 0,62 0,61 
Trust in institutions 0,40 0,56 
Eigenvalue (% of interpreted variance)  
1,14 (38,12) 1,21 (40,37) 
 
 
Developmental Potential of Social Capital 
 Socially beneficial effects of SC were tested by two analyses. The first used data on 
voting in last parliamentary elections, while the second analysis utilized the comparison 
of personal financial situation in 1990 and 2003. Whereas the first indicator assessed the 
level of basic political participation, the second one referred to personal capability to 
adapt to a new market framework. Instead of resorting to attitudinal analyses (assessing, 
for example, views on democracy or market economy), marred by practical impossibil-
ity to distinguish between the actual and the socially desirable views, the development 
potential of SC was addressed directly – through socially beneficial individual activi-
ties.  
 The analyses were carried out on the 2003 dataset7. The logic of the testing was sim-
ple: if the SC factor is associated with voting and positive assessment of personal finan-
cial situation it should be considered a developmental resource. The results confirmed 
theoretical expectation. If we compare the average results of the respondents who voted 
at the last parliamentary elections and of those who abstained on the latent SC variable, 
the first group was characterized by a considerably higher level of SC (t = 3,67;             
p < 0,001). To put in another way, the respondents who displayed a low level of SC 
were overrepresented among the absentees.  
 Similarly, there was a positive association between the level of SC and the assess-
ment of current personal finances as compared to the situation in 1990 (r = 0,14;            
p < 0,001)8. It should be noted that the analysis does not answer the question of whether 





7 To avoid the contamination with the situational effect of war (for a more detailed discussion see the next 
section), especially in the assessment of one’s financial situation, the 1995 dataset was excluded from the 
analyses. 
8 Although the correlation is weak, the more positive a respondent estimates the change of his or her 
financial situation in the period 1990– 2003, the higher his or her result on the latent SC variable. 
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The Dynamics of Social Capital 
  Tables 2 and 3 present the dynamics of SC during the 1995-2003 period. Contrary to 
the expectation based on economic growth9, accelerated democratization, and the in-
crease of social and political stability, the level of SC decreased in the observed period. 
The decline was recorded in two out of three dimensions. The level of generalized trust 
stayed the same (Table 2). After it had considerably decreased in 1999 (Štulhofer, 
2003a), in 2003 generalized trust returned to the initial 1995 level.10 Currently, only 
one-fourth of Croatian citizens claim to trust others. 
 
Table 2: Levels of generalized trust, 1995-2003 
1995 2003  
% 
“Most people can be trusted” 23,6 24 
“One needs to be very careful” 76,4 76 
n. s. (p > 0,12) 
 
 The levels of civic participation and trust in institutions have considerably decreased 
(Table 3). As to the first of the two dimensions, a systematic quality of the recorded 
change should be emphasized. Although a more detailed analysis showed that the de-
crease was most dramatic in the case of membership in religiously based associations   
(-38%) and than trade unions (-10%), the phenomenon of declining membership was 
observed in each and every category of civic participation.  
 
Table 3: Levels of civic participation, 1995-2003 
1995 2003  
Mean (S.D.) 
p < 
Civic participation 0,25 (0,25) 
0,13 
(0,20) 0,001 




 A more detailed insight into the proportions of change related to trust in institutions 
provided the analysis of the dynamics of trust in three key institutions: government, 
parliament (Croatian Sabor) and the legal system. As presented in Table 4, the trust in 
 
9 According to Croatian National Bank (http://www.hnb.hr), the growth of GDP per capita was the 
following: 1995 – 4,029; 1996 – 4,422; 1997 – 4,398; 1998 – 4,805; 1999 – 4,371; 2000 – 4,206; 2001 – 
4,477; 2002 – 5,137; 2003 – 6,484. 
10 Compared to Western European countries, the level of generalised trust in Croatia is considerably lower 
(Štulhofer, 2000: 90). 
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the legal system decreased by more than a half, while the trust in government decreased 
by approximately 45%. The trust in parliament suffered the least, decreasing by a third. 
 

















Legal system 58,4 41,6 26,6 73,4 0,001 
Government 59,4 40,6 32,5 59,4 0,001 
Parliament 48,5 51,5 30,5 69,5 0,001 
 
 
Correlates of Social Capital 
 Which factors influence the level of SC? To answer this question, central to inter-
preting the dynamics of SC, three multiple regression analyses were carried out (Table 
5).11 The first of the three analyzed dimensions, generalized trust, was found signifi-
cantly associated only with the perception of corruption.12 The negative correlation 
points to the fact that the perception of the extent of corruption in public services – re-
gardless of the actual (i.e. objective) situation – is destructive for social trust. It should 
be borne in mind that the finding is robust, since it was found to be statistically signifi-
cant both in 1995 and 2003. 
 The perception of corruption was the strongest predictor in the case of trust in 
institutions. Those who believed in the omnipresence of corruption were less likely to 
have confidence in important societal institutions. In addition to the perception of cor-
ruption, the level of trust in institutions was correlated with age (younger respondents 
displayed lower trust), education (better educated respondents were less trustful), the 
place of residence (respondents from larger communities reported lower trust), and po-
litical orientation (respondents on the “left” displayed lower levels of trust). Age, edu-
cation and the perception of corruption were found to be robust correlates of SC. 
 
 
11 As dichotomous variables, generalized trust and civic participation were analysed using logistic 
regression. Correlates of trust in institutions were assessed by linear regression (OLS). The analysis of each of 
the three dimensions was also carried out for each year separately (these analyses are not presented in the 
paper), in order to establish the correlates that are robust, i.e. significantly related to the dependent variable in 
both measurements (1995 and 2003). 
12 The list of independent variables was determined on the basis of the overview of empirical literature 
characterized by the quantitative macro-approach to SC. 
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Table 5: Correlates of generalised trust, civic participation and trust in institutions 
Generalised trusta Civic participationa 
Trust in 
institutionsb 
(N = 1.442) (N = 1.765) (N = 1.422) 
 
Odds ratio Beta 
Age 1,00 0,98***   0,11*** 
Gnder (1 = female) 1,09 1,61*** –0,02 
Education 1,21 1,65*** –0,11*** 
Size of the place of 
residence 1,06 0,91 –0,08** 
Household income 1,04 0,86*** –0,05 
Religiosity 1,33 5,03***   0,01 
Perception of corruption 0,79** 1,04 –0,27*** 
Political orientation: 
“left” – “right” 0,97 1,04   0,10*** 
*p < 0,05; **p < 0,01; ***p < 0,001 
a Logistic (multiple) regression; b linear (multiple) regression 
 
 Civic participation was correlated with education (better educated were more likely 
to be members of nongovernmental organizations), age and gender (younger respon-
dents and women were more likely to participate), religiosity (more religious respon-
dents were more likely to participate) and income. In the case of income, an additional 
analysis confirmed a non-linear relationship. The observed correlation is based on a 
distinct reluctance to associate among the respondents with highest income. No differ-
ence as to the degree of civic participation was found between the other income groups. 
 Of the five correlates, religiosity proved to be the only robust predictor of civic 
participation. The higher representation of religious persons in civic organizations could 
reflect their more pronounced communitarianism (Veenstra, 2002), that is the higher 
level of sensitivity for common interests and the needs of local community. 
 
Discussion: Situational Effects and Transitional Constraints to 
Measuring SC  
 How are we to explain the decline of SC in Croatia between 1995 and 2003? As al-
ready mentioned, the 1995 data were collected immediately after a large-scale military 
action, which in fact marked the end of war in Croatia. The military success and its con-
sequences provoked an explosion of national pride and public approval of political and 
military leadership. Could it be that the observed decrease in SC is superficial, mirror-
ing the 1995 situational effects that actually inflated SC? 
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 The hypothesis can be empirically corroborated. In 1995 the army and the police 
were the institutions which citizens trusted the most (Žunec, 1997)13. In the same year 
Croatia had the largest percentage of citizens who were members of religious associa-
tions in all the European countries represented in the World Values Survey project 
(Štulhofer, 2003a). Having in mind that the largest decrease in membership in 2003 was 
recorded in this very group of civic organizations, it is plausible to assume that a large 
number of these associations emerged during the war and ceased to exist after it ended. 
The charitable character of religiously based organizations (distribution of humanitarian 
aid), often founded by foreign or international religious organizations, often implied a 
personal gain for the members, helping them cope with the rough wartime years. An ad-
ditional argument is provided by the analysis of regional distribution of trust in institu-
tions in 1995. In line with the hypothesis on the situational effects, the highest level of 
trust in institutions was found in the regions most exposed to the hardships of war: in 
Lika and Banovina, and Slavonia. 
 In order to test the above hypothesis a couple of new analyses of the dynamics of 
civic association and trust in institutions were carried out, with religious associations 
excluded from the first analysis, and the army, the police and government excluded 
from the latter. As presented in Table 3, the decline in the density of civic participation 
and trust in institutions was found less severe, but statistically significant (p < 0,001 and 
p < 0,05, respectively). In other words, the decline of SC during the 1995-2003 period 
cannot be explained solely by the situational effect of the war. 
 The next possible objection highlights the futility of measuring the dynamics of SC 
with standard indicators, suggesting that they are not applicable in the context of post-
communist transition. Indeed, the difficulties which Dowley and Silver (2002) had with 
linking the SC indicators to the process of democratization in transition countries, and 
the absence of correlation between generalized trust and economic prosperity in the 
work of Raiser et al (2001) seem to suggest just that. 
 It is important to note that the argument presented above does not rest on an assump-
tion of a quantitative difference – as it would be the case, for example, if it would say 
that generalized trust is necessarily scarce in post-communist societies due to the legacy 
of the totalitarian state14 – but presupposes a qualitative difference or incommensurabil-
ity. The argument, in other words, insists that the standard indicators of SC measure one 
thing in the “West”, but something completely different in the “East”. Although the au-
thoritarian legacy and costs of transition (including widespread cynicism and opportun-
ism) are surely responsible for relatively low values of generalized trust and civic par-
ticipation15 (Rose et al., 1997; Raiser et al., 2001), it is not clear how they could change 
the content of the two dimensions. The finding that generalized or social trust is not re-
lated to economic prosperity in transition countries (Raiser et al, 2001: 6), could reflect 
a different character of the market economy rather than a different type of social trust. 
 
13 In the 1999 and 2003 national surveys the ranking of these two institutions was markedly lower.  
14 The case of GDR is particularly instructive. 
15 On the other hand, the very same costs of transition – particularly the decline in standard of living – 
may provide an extra motivation for joining various civic organizations.  
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The last dimension, trust in institutions, is a somewhat more complex case. If we take 
into consideration a series of difficulties related to post-communist institutional reforms 
and their low degree of efficiency in a number of transition countries, the question is 
raised as to whether it is trust or distrust in institutions in those countries that measures 
the acceptance of democratic rules of the game and the meritocratic concept of society 
better. 
 This dilemma affects the validity of the standard measurement of SC only superfi-
cially. It is, in fact, based on a quantitative, and not a qualitative distinction. Distrust in 
institutions, when based on a more or less realistic assessment of their inefficiency and 
the incompetence of their employees, clearly demonstrates the deficit of SC. As long as 
there is a correlation between trust in institutions and social trust (indicating inclination 
to cooperate), a different conclusion is unsustainable. The fact that the level of SC in the 
transitional context is determined by the activities of the state (or lack of them) and not 
by a spontaneous evolution of beneficial norms (Putnam, 1993), does not change the 
character of the relationship between trust in institutions and SC. Nor does it necessarily 
change the relationship among the dimensions of SC. Furthermore, the possibility that 
the distrust in institutions might encourage networking, as a way of substituting ineffi-
cient state institutions, is equally applicable to both the transitional and non-transitional 
context. Such a negative correlation between trust in institutions and civic participation, 
however, has first to be empirically demonstrated.  
 By rejecting the suggestion that macro indicators of SC are culture-specific we en-
counter the real limitations of the analyses presented in this paper. The central problem 
is a marginal percentage of the explained variance of SC dimensions.16 Simply put, the 
presented analyses do not provide enough data to clarify the negative dynamics of SC. 
A set of predictors which has been tested in regression analyses tells us very little about 
the reasons behind the erosion of SC. The search for more substantial factors is severely 
limited by the existing data. Sharing less than 20% percent of question the 1995 and 
2003 questionnaires allow but a very restricted comparison. Unfortunately, Croatia has 
no systematic (longitudinal) monitoring of social trends, such as the Eurobarometer or 
the US General Social Science Survey, which renders certain research ambitions unduly 
modest. 
 
Conclusion: On Perception of Corruption and the Role of the State 
 The presented analyses pointed to the decrease of SC in Croatia in the 1995-2003 
period that could not be exclusively attributed to the situational effect of the 1991-1995 
war. Among the correlates included in the regression models, the strongest and most 
consistent factor contributing to negative dynamics of CS through fragmentation of trust 
in institutions was found to be the increasing public perception of corruption among 
 
16 This particularly refers to generalised trust. To enable the comparison between logistic and linear 
regression models, a pseudo R2 (in logit equations) has been calculated according to the procedure described 
by Menard (1995: 23). Percentages of variance explained varied from 2% (generalized trust) to 15% (trust in 
institutions). 
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civil servants (Table 6).17 Although it is conceivable that both the SC deficit – expressed 
in chronic lack of trust and the unwillingness to cooperate – and suspicion of people in 
positions could be character traits18, a more plausible conclusion is that perception of 
corruption affects individual levels of SC. Decreasing social trust and trust in institu-
tions are adaptive reactions to the social environment that is perceived as unpredictable, 
risky and full of frauds. 
 
Table 6: Dynamics of the perception of corruption, 1995–2003 
1995 2003 Perception of the extent of taking bribes and corruption 
among civil servants % 
Almost no one is involved  1,3 1,4 
Only a few are involved 23,5 21,4 
Most are involved 60,5 53,8 
Almost all are involved 14,7 23,4 
p < 0,001 
 
 Indeed, how to maintain trust where norms seem to be breached regularly and with-
out sanctions? It is, undoubtedly, one of the central dilemmas of post-communist transi-
tion (Raiser et al., 2001; Rose et al., 1997; Štulhofer, 2000). On the bright side, a con-
structivist character of transitional societies – manifested in vast, “over night” institu-
tional reforms – makes it easier to notice and accept the importance of intervention into 
the socio-cultural fabric of society. Designer spirit of political, economic and social 
post-communist transformation legitimizes the role of the state in the development of 
SC.19 Having in mind that authoritarian regimes, collapsed in 1989, had interrupted a 
spontaneous historical development of the socially beneficial norms, the process of de-
mocratization necessarily entails the task of stimulating trust, cooperation and associa-
tion. In Croatia, its success will be closely related to the introduction of measures capa-
ble of reducing the perception of corruption. 
 
17 Bjornskov (2004) also reported the link between SC and the perception of corruption. The latter was 
measured by the Transparency International’s index of corruption. 
18 Making the relationship between the erosion of SC and the perception of corruption spurious. 
19 Fukuyama (2000) and Putnam (2000) have already prescribed this role to the US government.  
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